Enter a venture's numbers once — get NPV, IRR, a Target Pro-Forma Hurdle, partner-by-partner profit and loss allocation, leverage, and a distress screen, all recomputed live.
Generated with the Musharakah Decision Engine — musharakahengine.com
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NPV—IRR—Hurdle—Spread (IRR − Hurdle)—
This verdict is still being computed entirely from this tool's example numbers — none of the Cash Flow Builder or Target Pro-Forma Hurdle inputs have been changed yet. Enter your own deal's numbers above before relying on this result.
Suggested next steps
Sends these same inputs to an independent server-side copy of this engine and confirms the numbers above match exactly — the check a paid deliverable is built from.
InputsPartnership & Compliance Structure
These choices change how profit and loss are actually allocated below — they are not cosmetic labels.
Diminishing Musharakah replaces the profit-split and Murabaha/Ijarah financing below with a unit-based ownership buyout — a separate card appears once selected.
Standard asset-backed Murabaha/Ijarah cannot be used for general working capital — there is no asset to sell or lease. With Tawarruq off, the non-equity financing share below is forced to 0%; the full capital amount must be Musharakah/Mudarabah equity.
% — Partner B holds the rest. Losses on the equity capital must follow this ratio exactly, regardless of the profit split below.
% — can differ freely from the capital ratio; this is negotiable for profit only
% — an incentive tier (Tanazul), applied only to profit above the Target Pro-Forma Hurdle
Sharia boards do not agree on Tanazul. This engine models the bonus tier above as a performance-incentive waiver structure broadly accepted under Malaysia's SAC/BNM framework. Several GCC-region bank Sharia boards read Tanazul more restrictively — some require the waiver to be a genuine, undetermined-in-advance gift decided only after actual profit is known, not a pre-agreed formula like the one below. A structure this tool marks as workable can still be rejected by a specific bank's own Sharia committee. Confirm this mechanism by name with whichever board will actually review the deal, not with this tool.
%
% — held back from distributable profit each profitable year, drawn down first when a later year runs a deficit, released to partners at exit. Aligns with AAOIFI FAS 11 / IFSB profit-equalization practice.
No principal or profit guarantees between partners, in either structure or jurisdiction. A third party (never a partner) may guarantee principal under Malaysia's framework — out of scope for this calculator.
InputsDeal & Financing
Musharakah/Mudarabah (profit-and-loss-sharing capital) and Murabaha/Ijarah (cost-plus or lease financing tied to a specific asset) replace interest-bearing debt.
$
% — remainder is Musharakah/Mudarabah equity
% per year — cost-plus markup or rent, fixed from day one, not interest. Use an actual quoted rate from a local Islamic bank, or Bank Negara Malaysia's MYOR-i (transaction-based); avoid IIBR as an anchor — it has low market adoption
%
InputsDiminishing Musharakah — Ownership & Buyout
Sharika al-Milk (joint ownership of the asset) + an Ijarah lease on the Financier's remaining share + a separate, progressive purchase of that share by the Operating Partner — three linked contracts, kept legally distinct per OIC Fiqh Academy Resolution No. 110(4/12) on lease ending in ownership. The buyout term below runs independently of the venture's own cash-flow window used for the feasibility test above (set its own length in the Cash Flow Builder card) — a 20-year property buyout and a short feasibility check can coexist in the same deal.
% of the capital/asset — Operating Partner holds the rest from day one and buys out this share in equal annual units across the buyout term below
years to full buyout — the annual pace follows automatically (starting share ÷ this many years); set this to match your actual agreed pace instead of assuming a fixed 4-year term
% per year — must be an independently appraised market rent for the asset/business use, not a rate tied to the Financier's cost of capital, or it risks functioning as interest on the declining balance
% per year — drives the re-appraisal each unit's price is based on; 0% means value is assumed flat
% change in appraised value for that specific year — applied to the prior year's value, so it compounds year over year exactly like the uniform rate does, just set independently per year
AAOIFI treats this purchase promise as binding by design, not as a risk to avoid. Shari'ah Standard No. 49 (Al-Wa'd wa Al-Muwa'ada), clause 5/3, names this exact structure directly: both the Financier's promise to lease its remaining share and the Operating Partner's promise to buy units on a known schedule are described as judicially binding (wa'd mulzim qadaa'an). The real divergence among boards is narrower than "binding vs. non-binding" — it's about how much of the schedule can be fixed in advance before a one-sided Wa'ad starts to function like a mutual Muwa'ada, which Standard No. 49's own general framework (clause 4) treats more restrictively. Malaysia's SAC has generally been comfortable with a fully detailed structured schedule; some GCC boards prefer specific unit prices to be set fresh at each transfer date rather than locked in at the outset. Confirm which reading your specific bank or advisor follows.
Indexing rent to market value is independent of how the buyout unit itself is priced. Rent and unit price are kept as two separate dials on purpose: the rent basis above can track current value while the unit pricing basis stays on par-value (or vice versa). Neither should be inferred from the other — a lease yield is not a substitute for an independent asset appraisal, which is the specific separation OIC Resolution No. 110 exists to enforce.
Who pays upkeep costs isn't modeled here — and AAOIFI has an explicit rule about it. Standard No. 12, clause 5/3, states it is not permissible to make one partner alone bear insurance or maintenance costs merely because the asset will eventually be theirs — those costs should track ownership share like any other cost, not default entirely to the Operating Partner from day one. This calculator has no maintenance/insurance line in the Diminishing Musharakah schedule; if your real deal allocates these costs, structure that allocation to track each partner's declining/rising ownership share, not a flat assumption that the eventual full owner pays all of it throughout.
the schedule runs normally through the prior years, then settles the Financier's entire remaining share in one lump sum at the end of this year, priced on the unit buyout pricing basis selected above
$ — from your own advisor's estimate (stamp duty, registration fees, or CGT summed across all unit transfers, including a lump sum if the early buyout above is used). This tool does not calculate jurisdiction-specific tax rates itself; enter your own figure to see its drag on the numbers below. Leave at 0 to ignore.
InputsCash Flow Builder
Net cash flow is built up from operating assumptions, not typed in directly — revenue and costs flow through tax and working capital to a real per-year figure.
the venture's own feasibility cash-flow window (2–15 years) — independent of the Diminishing Musharakah buyout term above, which already runs any length on its own
Line item
Revenue
COGS
Operating expenses
Depreciation
Δ net working capital
Salvage value (final year only)
Capital impairment / write-down (one-time)
EBIT
Net cash flow
A one-time, non-cash reduction in the venture's asset value (an impairment, a forced write-down) — deliberately excluded from EBIT and Net Cash Flow above, since operating cash can stay perfectly positive in the same year a real capital loss occurs. It is instead shared directly by the capital ratio, exactly like any other capital loss, regardless of that year's cash result — see the separate line in Partner Profit & Loss Allocation below.
Unused tax loss carried forward (ending balance, final year)—
InputsTarget Pro-Forma Hurdle
A feasibility projection, not a promised return — pre-agreeing a fixed, guaranteed yield on equity capital would invalidate the Musharakah/Mudarabah. Islamic-CAPM-style build-up, benchmarked to a sukuk profit rate rather than a risk-free interest rate.
% — anchor to observed short-term sukuk profit rates (e.g. IILM's regular issuances) rather than guessing
sensitivity to the Islamic equity market — cross-check against a Shariah-index sector beta (S&P/Dow Jones Shariah, or Damodaran's sector betas filtered for low-leverage industries) rather than a round-number guess
% — same source as beta above
% — "profit of a similar Mudaraba/Musharakah" is the actual fiqh standard here (a comparable-deal rate), not an arbitrary number
InputsCompany Snapshot
Additional balance-sheet figures used only by the leverage and distress-screen checks on the right.
OutputBlended Feasibility Hurdle
The discount rate used for the venture-level feasibility test below — weighted by how much of the capital is equity vs. Murabaha/Ijarah. This is a planning target, never a claim owed to anyone.
Equity target rate (Rₛ = Rₛ₁₳ + β×premium)—
Murabaha/Ijarah rate, after tax—
Blended Feasibility Hurdle—
OutputValuation
NPV
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IRR
—
Profitability index
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MIRR
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NPV across a range of discount rates — the marked point is today's blended profit rate.
Sukuk secondary markets are thin and a beta for an unlisted SME is inherently approximate — a hurdle rate built from them is rarely as precise as one decimal point suggests. This shows how the verdict holds up to a plain ±1 percentage point error in that hurdle.
Hurdle rate
NPV
Verdict
OutputPartner Profit & Loss Allocation
The equity capital's combined return, after Murabaha/Ijarah service and the contingency reserve — split between partners year by year as provisional distributions on account, per OIC Fiqh Academy Resolution No. 30: interim payouts are advances, not final profit, until a true reckoning (Tandeed) at exit.
Combined equity return (IRR)
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Return multiple
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Payback
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Discounted payback
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Partner A provisional total (on account)
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Partner B provisional total (on account)
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Contingency reserve collected (released at exit)
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Partner A capital impairment absorbed
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Partner B capital impairment absorbed
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OutputFinal True-Up at Exit (Tandeed)
The lifetime result, split once under the same rules — a real reconciliation against the provisional payouts above, not a formality. A non-zero adjustment means a bad year's loss should have drawn down earlier provisional profit before the capital-ratio loss rule applied to it in isolation.
Not applicable. At effectively $0 partnership equity capital, there is no partner capital account left to reconcile at exit — see the warning in Partner Profit & Loss Allocation above.
Lifetime distributable (net of financing & reserve)—
Less: capital impairment absorbed (both partners)—
Capital impairment is already deducted above, in both the provisional totals on this page and the lifetime entitlement below — it is not applied a second time here. A non-zero true-up reflects only the gap between what was already paid out provisionally and this final reconciliation, not the impairment itself.
Partner A lifetime entitlement—
Partner B lifetime entitlement—
True-up owed TO Partner A—
True-up owed TO Partner B—
OutputReconciliation Ledger (for Your Accountant)
Illustrative journal-entry-style lines for the numbers above — most standard accounting systems (Xero, QuickBooks, SAP) have no native concept of a provisional distribution under OIC Resolution 30 or an AAOIFI FAS 11 reserve, so these need to be posted as manual entries. Select and copy this table into a spreadsheet (Excel/Google Sheets keeps the columns on paste), or use the Print button above to save it as PDF. Account names are generic placeholders — map them to your own chart of accounts.
Not applicable. With no partnership equity capital remaining, there are no partner distribution entries to post — see the warning in Partner Profit & Loss Allocation above.
Year
Debit account
Credit account
Amount
Memo
OutputDiminishing Musharakah — Buyout Schedule
Each year: rent on the Financier's remaining share, plus that year's ownership-unit purchase price, both paid by the Operating Partner. The Financier's ownership — and the rent it earns — declines every year until it reaches zero.
Year
Appraised value used
Financier's ownership (start)
Rent to Financier
Unit purchase price
Financier's ownership (end)
Financier's realized return (IRR)
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Operating Partner's total buyout outlay
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Est. transfer-tax drag (your input)
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Operating Partner's all-in cost (incl. est. tax)
—
Cumulative effect of your custom shock schedule on the final appraised value—
Early Buyout Settlement (Wa'ad Exercise)
Both settlement bases shown for comparison — only the one matching the unit buyout pricing basis above is actually applied to the cash flows.
Market-value lump sum—
Par-value lump sum—
Applied to this deal—
Full Schedule Without the Early Exit (For Comparison)
Reference only — what the buyout would have looked like had the Operating Partner continued the equal annual units through the full term instead of exercising the early Wa'ad above. The Financier's realized return and Operating Partner's total outlay shown above still reflect the ACTUAL early-exit scenario, not this one.
Year
Appraised value used
Financier's ownership (start)
Rent to Financier
Unit purchase price
Financier's ownership (end)
Full-term total outlay (no early exit)—
Early-exit total outlay (actually applied)—
Difference (early exit vs. full term)—
OutputLeverage & Break-Even
COGS treated as fully variable, operating expenses as fully fixed.
Operating leverage (DOL)
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Financial leverage (DFL)
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Combined leverage (DCL)
—
Break-even revenue
—
OutputDistress Screen
Altman Z-Score (1968) — calibrated on public manufacturers; treat as a rough screen, not a rating.
Z-Score—
Zone—
Read thisLegal & Tax Considerations
Sharia compliance and legal enforceability are two different questions — this tool only answers the first one. Neither item below is computed; both need a professional in your actual jurisdiction, not this calculator.
Partner liability may not match the profit/loss split above. Under default general-partnership law in most common-law jurisdictions (e.g. Western Australia's Partnership Act 1895, s.19 — likely similar in others), every partner is jointly and severally liable to outside creditors for the firm's debts, regardless of what this tool's internal Sharia-based allocation says. A "silent" Rab-ul-Mal or a loss-protected Mudarib can still be pursued personally for the full debt by a third party, and would then need a separate contribution/indemnity agreement to recover from the other partner. That agreement — and possibly a limited-liability structure instead of a plain partnership — is a conversation for a local lawyer, alongside the Sharia advisor.
Transferring an asset into a Murabaha/Ijarah structure can trigger tax twice. Buying an asset into the financing structure and then transferring it again to the venture can mean stamp duty or capital gains tax applies at both steps, where a conventional single-purchase loan would only trigger it once. The UK has explicit statutory relief for this (Finance Act 2003, ss.71A & 73, for qualifying alternative finance arrangements) — worth checking whether your jurisdiction has an equivalent before assuming either that it does or that it doesn't.
Diminishing Musharakah compounds the double-transfer issue above. Each year's ownership-unit purchase is, in form, a separate sale of an undivided share in the asset — so a jurisdiction that taxes transfers (stamp duty, registration fees, capital gains) may apply that tax on every single unit transfer across the buyout term, not once. Some jurisdictions with alternative-finance relief extend it to staged transfers like this; many don't say either way. Confirm this specifically before using a diminishing structure for real property or registered equipment.